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I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between state and citizen is a central problem of
international law. It is well established that the state can regulate the
citizen's conduct even when the citizen is overseas.' It is also clear that the
state must protect the citizen from human-rights abuse at home,2 and that
the state can afford its citizens diplomatic protection while abroad.3 But
can the state protect its citizen by punishing any crime committed against
that citizen by a foreign national in a foreign country? That is, can a state
exercise "passive personality jurisdiction"--criminal jurisdiction based solely
on the nationality of the victim?
Passive personality jurisdiction is probably the most controversial4
form of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.5 Many countries, including
the United States, have traditionally opposed this theory of jurisdiction.
These states have argued that it would be unfair for state A to prosecute a
foreign national for a crime committed on foreign soil solely because the
victim is a national of state A. They have also suggested that such a
prosecution would intrude on the sovereignty of the state in which the
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES S 402(2)
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for
Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT'L L 41, 70 (1992).
2. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, arts. 55-56, reprinted in 3 Bevans 1153 (June 26, 1945) (obliging
members to respect human rights for all); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (obliging each state party to ensure the human rights
of "all individuals within its territory").
3. See, e.g., EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD S 13,
at 25 (1970).
4. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 402 cmt. g (noting that passive personality jurisdiction
"has not been generally accepted" for ordinary torts or crimes); Harvard Research on
International Law, Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. INT'L L 435, 579 (Supp. 1935)
[hereinafter Harvard Research] (asserting that passive personality jurisdiction "has been more
strongly contested than any other type of competence.").
5. International law recognizes four other bases ofextraterritorial jurisdiction. The territorial-
effects principle embraces acts affecting a state's territory, such as illegal immigration. See IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 300-02 (3d ed. 1979). The nationality
principle covers crimes committed by a state's nationals abroad. See Watson, supra note 1, at
67-70. The protective principle covers crimes committed abroad that implicate the state's
security. See generally Monika B. Krizek, Note, The Protective Principle of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: A Brief History and an Application of the Principle to Espionage as an Illustration of
Current United States Practice, 6 B.U. INT'L LJ. 337 (1988). Finally, the universal principle covers
crimes so heinous that all states may exercise jurisdiction over them. See Kenneth C. Randall,
Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L REv. 785, 839 (1988).
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crime occurred and therefore, that this state should exercise its jurisdic-
tion.6 In recent years, however, some of those same states have argued
that passive personality jurisdiction should be invoked to support
prosecution of terrorists.
7
This Article examines the merits of the passive personality principle of
criminal jurisdiction, focusing particularly on United States practice. Part
II traces the evolution of passive personality jurisdiction in United States
law, asserting that passive personality jurisdiction had almost no place in
United States law until the 1970s, when Congress began to seek ways to
punish terrorist acts against Americans overseas. Part III argues that
international law should permit states to exercise passive personality
jurisdiction, but only if the defendant is not prosecuted either by the state
in which the crime was committed or by the defendant's home state. Part
IV considers whether there is a constitutional basis for Congress to enact
extraterritorial criminal laws based solely on the passive personality princi-
ple. This part also analyzes recent efforts by Congress to expand passive
personality jurisdiction beyond terrorist crimes. Finally, part V argues that
the debate over passive personality jurisdiction illustrates the need for a
more systemic approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction generally.
6. See, e.g., Letter of Ass't Secretary of State Janet G. Mullins, Dec. 26, 1989 (criticizing
passive personality jurisdiction), reprinted in 137 CONG. Rzc. S4750-52 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1991)
(statements of Sen. Thurmond and Sen. Hollings) [hereinafter Letter of Janet G. Mullins].
States have also objected to the assertion of passive personality jurisdiction over torts and
other civil wrongs. See, e.g., Jurisdiction Based on Nationality, 1975 DIGEST 9 2, at 339-40
(reporting United States objections to Greece's assertion of jurisdiction over a United States citizen
involved in a car accident with a Greek national in the United States); Jurisdiction Based on
Nationality, 1973 DIGEST S 2, at 197-98 (reporting United States objections to a similar assertion
of jurisdiction by Greece). On the whole, however, the most rancorous disputes over passive
personality jurisdiction have involved criminal cases. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Report
on Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case, in FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES 751-867 (1887) [hereinafter Report on the Cutting Case] (discussed infra part II).
Although this Article does not deal explicitly with application of passive personality jurisdiction
in civil cases, most of the Article's analysis may be applied to civil cases. See H.F. VAN PANHUYS,
THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (1959) (noting that passive personality
jurisdiction raises similar issues in civil and criminal cases).
7. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 402 cmt. g (noting wider acceptance of passive
personality jurisdiction when applied to terrorism).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF PASSIVE PERSONALITY JURISDICTION
IN UNITED STATES PRACTICE
The passive personality principle was not a part of early United States
law. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Anglo-American
jurisprudence stressed that jurisdiction over crime was essentially territo-
rial.8 However, early United States authorities did exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction over offenses on board United States-flag vessels on the high
seas, and they established certain criminal laws, such as treason, for which
jurisdiction was based on nationality or protective principles.9  But the
United States did not establish or exercise jurisdiction founded solely on the
nationality of the victim.' 0
In the mid-nineteenth century the United States embarked on a far-
reaching program of consular jurisdiction, known as "extraterritoriality,"
in which United States consular officers exercised exclusive jurisdiction over
United States nationals in less developed countries." In general, this
exclusive extraterritorial jurisdiction was confined to criminal offenses by
Americans, not crimes by foreigners against Americans. For example, the
treaty establishing United States extraterritorial rights in China provided
that United States nationals accused of "any crime" in China would be tried
by a United States consul, whereas Chinese subjects accused of crimes
8. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L 880, 883 (1989); Note, Constructing the State
Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the National Interest, and Transnational Norms, 103
HARV. L Rv. 1273, 1276 (1990); JOHN WESTLA E, INTERNATIONAL LAw: PART I - PEACE
252-53 (1910) (noting that the English common law "punished nothing not done in England,
thus adopting fully the principle known as the territoriality of crime."). Cf Regina v. Keyn,
[1876] 2 Ex. D. 63, 117 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1876) ("[A] foreigner committing an offence of any kind,
even against an Englishman, on foreign territory cannot be tried for it in an English Court.").
9. See Watson, supra note 1, at 49 (nationality principle describes jurisdiction over persons
owing allegiance to the United States; protective principle describes jurisdiction over nationals
when protecting the security interests of the state).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 25 F. Cas. 786, 787 (D. Mass. 1837) (No. 14,151) (Story,
J.) (dictum) (asserting that the United States would lack jurisdiction over the murder of a United
States national by a foreigner on a foreign vessel on the high seas). Occasionally, however, courts
suggested in dictum that United States extraterritorial jurisdiction might reach foreign defendants
for crimes committed abroad. See, eg., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 568 (1840)
(Taney, C.J.) (dictum) (suggesting that United States statutes might apply to any fugitive "found"
in the United States).
11. See generally SECRETARY or STATE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES, EXPATRIATION,




against United States nationals would be tried by Chinese authorities.12
Thus, even while the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction over
crimes by its nationals in less developed countries-in effect requiring
foreign states to surrender part of their territorial jurisdiction-it declined
to assert jurisdiction simply because the victim was a United States national.
Apparently United States discomfort with passive personality jurisdiction
was strong enough to override the imperialist impulses that spawned
consular jurisdiction.
Indeed, the United States expressly rejected another country's exercise
of the passive personality principle in 1887, in Cuttings case.' 3 In 1886
A.K. Cutting, an American citizen, published an editorial in a Mexican
newspaper questioning the character of a Mexican national named Emigdio
Medina.14 At Medina's request Mexico brought charges of criminal libel
against Cutting, who settled the matter by agreeing to publish a retraction
in the Mexican paper.' 5 The retraction, however, turned out to be
"Cmicroscopic" and "uninteligible."16 Moreover, Cutting reiterated his
derogatory allegations in an editorial in the El Paso Herald, a Texas
newspaper, the same day the retraction was published in Mexico, and he
circulated copies of the Herald editorial in Mexico.' 7 Mexico thereupon
renewed its criminal proceedings against Cutting, and a Mexican court
convicted him of criminal libel, holding that publication of the article in
Texas was governed by a Mexican law establishing jurisdiction over "[p]enal
offenses committed in a foreign country . . . by a foreigner against
Mexicans."18 The court sentenced Cutting to a year of hard labor and
imposed a $600 fine. 19
12. Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce, July 3, 1844, U.S.-China, art. XXI, 6 Bevans 647,
654. A number of other treaties contained similar provisions. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship and
Commerce, Dec. 13, 1856, U.S.-Persia, art. V, 8 Bevans 1254, 1256; Treaty on Rights of American
Citizens in Japan, June 17, 1857, U.S.-Japan, art. IV, 9 Bevans 359, 360; Treaty of Friendship and
Commerce, Jan. 17, 1878, U.S.-Samoa, art. IV, 11 Bevans 437, 438.
13. See Report on the Cutting Case, supra note 6.
14. Cutting, who was "engaged in editing" the Mexican newspaper, criticized Medina's
proposal to start a rival newspaper in the same town. Report on the Cutting Case, supra note 6,
at 757. Mexico obtained custody of Cutting because Cutting "declared himself to be ... a
resident of this town [Paso del Norte]." Id. at 761 (quoting Mexican district court).
15. Id. Mexican law fixed a punishment of up to two years' imprisonment and a fine of up
to $2000 for "defamation" that may cause "dishonor or serious prejudice." Id. at 761 n.t
(quoting art. 646 of the Mexican Penal Code).
16. Id. at 761-62 (reprinting decision of Mexican district court).
17. Id. at 762.
18. Id. (citing art. 186 of the Mexican Penal Code). The court held in the alternative that
Cutting was guilty of violating the conciliation agreement on the original defamation in Mexico
because he had not published an adequate retraction and had "ratified" the defamation by
renewing it in Texas. Id.
19. Id. at 764.
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The United States vigorously protested the Mexican criminal
proceedings. The State Department sent a strongly worded set of instruc-
tions to the American minister in Mexico City, asserting that Mexico's
exercise of jurisdiction was "wholly inadmissible," and directing the Minis-
ter to demand Cuttings immediate release.20 The Department later
elaborated on its rationale, arguing that international law did not permit a
state to prosecute a crime simply because the victim was one of its
nationals.21 Such a system, said the Department, would expose people in
their own country to a potentially infinite responsibility; each new
accretion of foreigners would increase the number of foreign laws that a
citizen would be required to obey while in her own country.22 Mexico's
exercise of jurisdiction also prompted criticism from the White House.23
In the face of these protests, Medina withdrew his criminal complaint.24
No doubt the Mexican government encouraged him to do so to avoid
further friction.
Although the Cutting case reflects United States hostility toward passive
personality jurisdiction, other aspects of the case probably contributed to
the United States response. To United States officials, the punishment
hardly fit the crime. Defamation was punished lightly in the United States,
if at all.25 The State Department stressed that the case implicated freedom
of speech and that Mexican authorities had treated Cutting harshly in
jail.26 One might ask whether the United States would have protested
Mexico's assertion of jurisdiction so loudly had Cutting been accused of
mass murder of Mexican nationals in Texas.
Moreover, Mexico's assertion of jurisdiction does not seem to have
been grounded solely on the nationality of the "victim," Medina. The
Mexican court noted that Cutting had initially published a libel in Mexico,
had agreed to retract it but failed to do so adequately, and had circulated
the Texas editorial in Mexico.27 In an alternative holding, the court
seemed to indicate that it could exercise territorial jurisdiction over any of
these acts without invoking the passive personality principle.28 Because
it does appear that some of these acts justified an exercise of territorial
jurisdiction, the Mexican court may have needlessly enraged the United
20. Id. at 759.
21. Id. at 813.
22. Id. at 840.
23. Id. at 839.
24. Id. at 767.
25. See id. at 758 (referring to the crime as a misdemeanor).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 761-62.
28. See id. at 762 (noting that failure to fulfill the conciliation agreement carried the same
responsibility as the libel offense itselo.
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States by asserting jurisdiction due to the publication of an article in Texas,
and not simply exercising jurisdiction over the acts in Mexico.
In any event, the views expressed by the United States in the Cutting
case remained the United States position for almost one hundred years.29
Most other states also remained suspicious of passive personality jurisdic-
tion in the twentieth century. Some states established passive personality
jurisdiction but few exercised it, and those that did sometimes encountered
strong opposition from other states. In 1926, for example, Turkey brought
manslaughter charges against the French first officer of the Lotus, a French
vessel that had collided with a Turkish vessel on the high seas, killing eight
Turkish nationals. 30 Turkey based its jurisdiction on a Turkish statute
providing for jurisdiction over "[a]ny foreigner who ...commits an
offence abroad to the prejudice of Turkey or of a Turkish subject."3'
France vigorously objected to Turkey's assertion of jurisdiction, and the two
states referred the matter to the Permanent Court of International justice
for a resolution.
A bare majority of the Permanent Court held that Turkey could
exercise jurisdiction over the French first officer.32 The Court began by
stressing that the "result of the collision"-the death of eight Turkish sailors
and passengers-was "a factor essential for the institution of the criminal
proceedings in question.".33 Next, the Court held that international law
rests entirely on the positive acts of states, and that France must identify a
relevant "rule of international law limiting the freedom of States to extend
the criminal jurisdiction of their courts." 34  The Court found no such
prohibition, holding that Turkey's assertion of jurisdiction was justified as
an exercise of territorial or territorial-effects jurisdiction because the
collision had damaging effects on a floating bit of Turkish territory.35
The Court did not decide whether Turkey's prosecution might also be
29. See infra notes 48-75 and accompanying text.
30. The S.S. "Lotus" (Pr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 13 (Sept. 7).
31. Id. at 14-15 quoting art. 6 of the Turkish Penal Code (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 32.
33. Id. at 13.
34. Id. at 18-21. This aspect of the Court's opinion has fueled the ongoing debate over
whether international law grows out of the "natural rights" of states or whether it derives solely
from the "consent" of states. See, e.g., J.L BmERLY, THE LAw or NATIONs 49-56 (6th ed. 1963)
(rejecting both contentions); Edward M. Morgan, Criminal Proces International Law, and
Extraterritorial Crime, 38 U. ToRoTro L. 245, 249-50 (1988) (arguing that the decision reflects
the libertarianism that characterizes modem international relations).
35. The S.S. "Lotus", supra note 30, at 23.
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justified by the nationality of the victims, even though the Turkish statute
itself established jurisdiction largely on this basis.36
The dissenting judges criticized the Court's failure to consider the
validity of passive personality jurisdiction. They argued that Turkey sought
to exercise jurisdiction primarily on that basis, not on a territorial-effects
theory, and that customary international law prohibited the exercise of such
jurisdiction.37 The dissent's view was later vindicated, at least in part,
when the Convention on the High Seas of 1958 overruled the narrow
holding of Lotus by providing that only the flag state or the responsible
officer's home state could prosecute the officer for collisions or other
incidents of navigation on the high seas.38
Eight years after Lotus, a group of Harvard faculty and students,
known collectively as the Harvard Research on International Law, published
an influential study on international law.39 The study included a draft
convention on jurisdiction that omitted passive personality because it is
"the most difficult [principle] to justify in theory," and because its
inclusion "would only invite controversy without serving any useful
objective."40  The draft convention nonetheless did permit states to
exercise "universal" jurisdiction over aliens who commit crimes against
their nationals outside the territory of any state,4l all the while insisting
that this form of jurisdiction was not passive personality jurisdiction. 42
Finally, the study appears to have adopted for standard use the term
"passive personality" jurisdiction, which was to be distinguished from
"active personality" jurisdiction, or jurisdiction based on the nationality of
the offender.43
36. Id. at 22-23. The opinion has nonetheless been construed as approving passive
personality jurisdiction. Cf Jon C. Cowen, Note, The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986: Faulty Drafting May Defeat Efforts to Bring Terrorists to justice, 21
CoNEa. J. INTrr' L 127, 143-44 (1988) (noting that lack of an international consensus on passive
personality principle legitimacy will hinder extradition).
37. The S.S. "Lotus", supra note 30, at 34 (MM. Loder dissenting).
38. See Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 11, 13 U.S.T. 2313, 450 U.N.T.S.
82.
39. See Harvard Research, supra note 4.
40. Id. at 579. The study noted that many states continued to reject passive personality
jurisdiction. Id.
41. See id. at 573 (excerpting art. 10(c) of draft convention).
42. Id. at 589 (reaffirming that the Article was based on the universality principle, not the
passive personality principle).
43. See id. at 578 (noting support in the practice of other states who call the jurisdiction
"passive personality, personalit6 passive, Schutzprinzip"); Christopher Blakesley, A Conceptual
Framework for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 1984 UTAH L REv. 685,
687 & n.7 (noting wide acceptance of Harvard Research terminology).
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Until recently United States policy on passive personality jurisdiction
reflected the skepticism expressed in the Harvard Research. The first
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States confidently took
the position that customary international law did not permit the exercise of
passive personality jurisdiction.** The Second Restatement reiterated this
view in the 1960s. 45 During the 1970s United States representatives spoke
against passive personality jurisdiction, objecting to Greek attempts to take
civil jurisdiction over United States nationals who injured Greek nationals
in car accidents occurring in the United States.46 As late as 1989, the
United States took the same position in a case involving the murder of a
United States national in Korea.47
Despite these statements, passive personality jurisdiction began to creep
into United States law in the early 1970s when the United States entered
into a series of multilateral terrorism conventions, sometimes founded on
passive personality jurisdiction, that obliged states to extradite or prosecute
offenders for various terrorist offenses. In 1973, for example, the United
States signed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 48
which obliged and authorized states to exercise jurisdiction over crimes
against their diplomats and other agents abroad. Pursuant to the Conven-
tion, the United States established laws penalizing crimes against American
officials and diplomats abroad.49  These statutes, however, can be
understood as examples of the protective principle of jurisdiction rather
than the passive personality principle because they protect senior officials
of the government, and thus, arguably, the security of the state.
Even if the Internationally Protected Persons Convention can be
explained as an exercise of protective jurisdiction, United States adherence
to the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages50 seems
It is perhaps a tribute to the power of alliteration that the term "passive personality" now
enjoys broad acceptance but the term "active personality" does not. The latter has yielded to the
term "nationality jurisdiction." Cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 402 cmt. g (describing "passive
personality jurisdiction") with S 402 cmt. b (describing "nationality jurisdiction").
44. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES S 25 (1949).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
30(2) (1965).
46. See Jurisdiction Based on Nationality, 1975 DIGEST S 2, supra note 6; Jurisdiction Based
on Nationality, 1973 DIGEST S 2, supra note 6.
47. See Letter of Janet G. Mullins, supra note 6 (criticizing passive personality jurisdiction).
48. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S.
167.
49. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. SS 1114, 1117 (1988).
50. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456
(1979).
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close to actually embracing passive personality jurisdiction. The Conven-
tion calls on states to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist
crimes committed by and, if "appropriate," against their nationals.5 1 The
United States implemented the convention by adopting the Hostage Taking
Act,52 which authorized the Justice Department to prosecute terrorist
crimes "by or against" United States nationals abroad.53 Unlike the
statutes implementing the Internationally Protected Persons Convention, the
Hostage Taking Act extended to terrorist crimes against any United States
national, not just United States officials, and thus seems closer to passive
personality jurisdiction.54 A fair case can be made, though, that the act
is designed not simply to protect American citizens from hostage-taking,
but also to protect national security from coercion by terrorists. In other
words, the Hostage Taking Act may fit under the protective principle as
well as the passive personality principle because the security of the state, not
just individuals, is at stake.
During the 1980s the United States continued to inch toward passive
personality jurisdiction over terrorist crimes. Following the Achille Lauro
incident in 1985, which caused the death of an American passenger named
Leon Klinghoffer,55 Congress extended the reach of the terrorism laws,
establishing jurisdiction over any violent crime committed against an
American so long as the crime was intended to coerce a "government or
civilian population."56 In 1986, the authors of the Third Restatement
acknowledged that while passive personality remained controversial, it had
won some acceptance as a basis for prosecuting terrorists.57
51. Id. art. 5(1)(d).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988).
53. Id.
54. Some commentators have taken this position. See, e.g., Andreas Lowenfeld, U.S. Law
Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 880, 886-88
(1989); Lynda M. Clarizio, Comment, United States v. Yunis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L 94, 99 (1989)
(arguing that the Hostage Taking Act adopts both passive personality and universality principles).
55. U.S. Drops a Warrant in '85 Ship Hijacking, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 1988, at AS.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988). The bill's authors have insisted that it rests on the protective
principle, not the passive personality principle. See 132 CONG. REc. S1382-87 (daily ed. Feb. 19,
1986) (remarks of Sen. Specter). A number of commentators agree. See Christopher Blakesley,
Jurisdiction as Legal Protection Against Terrorism, 19 CONN. L REv. 895, 942 (1987); Patrick
Donnelly, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad. Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CoYNELu L Rav. 599, 611, 613 (1987); but
see Jeannemarie Gardes, Note, Exercising Extraterritorial jurisdiction over Terrorists: 18 U.S.C. S 7
and 18 U.S.C. § 2331, 10 CRIM. Jus. J. 307, 333-34 (1988). Inescapably, however, criminal
liability under the Act may turn solely on the nationality of the victim, suggesting that it contains
at least an element of passive personality jurisdiction.
57. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402 cmt. g.
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The United States has not used its new terrorism statutes often. In
1986 the Justice Department indicted the mastermind of the Achille Lauro
hijacking, Mohammed Abbas, but the United States dropped the indictment
after Italy convicted the suspect in absentia s.5 More recently, the United
States successfully prosecuted a Lebanese national named Fawaz Yunis for
his role in hijacking a Jordanian airliner carrying, among others, three
American citizens. A federal district court upheld the prosecution as a valid
exercise of both universal and passive personality jurisdiction.59 Although
this exercise of passive personality jurisdiction resembles the exercise of
protective jurisdiction, the federal district court in Yunis specifically declined
to rely on protective jurisdiction.60 Affirming Yunis' conviction, the D.C.
Circuit asserted that customary international law did not bar this exercise
of jurisdiction. 61 The court held, however, that the congressional statute
authorizing prosecution was valid whether or not it violated customary
international law, noting that United States courts enforce United States
statutes that dearly supersede prior inconsistent customary international
law.62 The prosecution of Yunis and the indictment of Abbas certainly
suggest that the United States has begun to accept the passive personality
principle, if only as applied to terrorist crimes.
Outside of terrorism, however, the United States still seems reluctant
to embrace passive personality jurisdiction. Although Congress has
recognized passive personality jurisdiction for some terrorist offenses, it has
not extended such jurisdiction to common crimes of violence against
Americans on foreign soil.63 In 1989 the Executive Branch, speaking
though the State Department, reiterated its long-standing opposition to
passive personality jurisdiction.64 Apart from the Yunis case, the Judiciary
has not had much occasion to pass on its validity. A number of courts
however have expressed approval of passive personality jurisdiction even
though another basis of jurisdiction, usually protective, was more apt.
58. U.S. Drops a Warrant in '85 Ship Hijacking, supra note 55, at A5.
59. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 903 (D.D.C. 1988), affd, 924 F.2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
60. 681 F. Supp. at 903 n.14.
61. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing the district court's
reliance on the passive personality and protective principles). This holding may have been
dictum, since the court also concluded that a rule of customary international law prohibiting
passive personality jurisdiction would yield to a later-enacted statute establishing the jurisdiction.
Id.
62. Id. Cf The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (customary international law is
controlling "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act").
63. See 18 U.S.C. S 7(7) (1988) (crimes outside jurisdiction of any nation); S. 1241, S 3203,
102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) (unenacted proposal to extend jurisdiction to murders of Americans
abroad).
64. See Letter of Janet G. Mullins, supra note 6.
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These cases mostly relate to United States prosecutions of foreigners for
crimes against DEA agents and other United States officials 65 or
extradition of fugitives to foreign states for similar crimes.
66
At least one United States judicial opinion reflects hostility to passive
personality jurisdiction. In United States v. Columba-Colella67 the Fifth
Circuit dismissed the indictment of a Mexican national accused of
knowingly receiving in Mexico a car stolen from a United States national.
The court flatly acknowledged that "[tihere is no question . .. that
Columba-Colella's conduct somehow affected a United States citizen,"
because if successful "he would have prevented the stolen car from finding
its way back to its owner."68 The court nonetheless held that Congress
did not intend to assert jurisdiction over this conduct under 18 U.S.C.
5 2313 (which criminalizes the receipt of stolen goods in foreign commerce)
because Congress lacked the "competence" to do S0.69 The court added:
It is difficult to distinguish the present case from one in which the
defendant had attempted not to fence a stolen car but instead to
pick the pockets of American tourists in Acapulco. No one
would argue either that Congress would be competent to prohibit
such conduct or that the courts of the United States would have
jurisdiction to enforce such a prohibition were the offender in
their control. Indeed, Congress would not be competent to attach
criminal sanctions to the murder of an American by a foreign
national in a foreign country, even if the victim returned home
and succumbed to his injuries.70
Nonetheless, there are signs that the United States, or at least Congress,
is moving toward passive personality jurisdiction outside the realm of
65. See, e.g., United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 E.2d 1200, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that passive personality and other jurisdictional principles "cumulatively" justified
prosecution of foreign national for crime against DEA agent); United States v. Benitez, 741 P.2d
1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that protective and passive personality principles supported
prosecution of foreign national for crime against DEA agent).
66. See Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that the requesting
state based jurisdiction on protective and passive personality principles).
67. 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979).
68. Id. at 360.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 0P THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES SS 18, 30(2) (1965)).
One other court, citing Columba-Colella, declined to pass judgment on passive personality
jurisdiction, noting that other jurisdictional bases justified the prosecution at issue. United States
v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (murder of Congressman in Guyana).
Columba-Colella is discussed in more detail infra part V.
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terrorism. In 1987 Congress expanded United States jurisdiction to include
crimes against Americans "outside the jurisdiction of any nation"-that is,
on the high seas or in Antarctica. 71 In 1991, following the unprosecuted
murder of a United States national in Korea, 72 both houses of Congress
passed legislation that would have established jurisdiction over murders of
United States nationals on foreign soil. 73 Although Congress shelved the
legislation, which was part of the Omnibus Crime Bill, at the end of the
session because the White House opposed provisions unrelated to the
passive personality proposal,74 the proposal will almost certainly rise
again.75
International practice has mirrored that of the United States. The
international community has not, by and large, accepted passive personality
jurisdiction except as applied to terrorism-and that form of jurisdiction
may resemble protective or even universal jurisdiction more than passive
personality jurisdiction. To be sure, some states have enacted statutes
establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction over common crimes against their
nationals.76 But few states have actually exercised such jurisdiction,
deferring instead to the state in which the crime occurred. France, for
example, has established jurisdiction over serious crimes against its nationals
but has generally declined to exercise it.77 It seems doubtful that this
limited amount of state practice amounts to a rule of customary inter-.
71. See 18 U.S.C. S 7(7) (1988).
72. See Oregonian Returns Home After Five Months in Korean Prison, UPI, Jan. 1, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
73. See S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
74. See Guy Gugliotta, Senate GOP Stalling Defeats Crime Bill; House Passed Measure Bush
Called Too Soff WASH. PosT, Nov. 28, 1991, at A41 (describing a successful Republican
filibuster).
75. The bill apparently had little chance of passing the 102d session of Congress, however.
See Republicans' Filibuster in Senate Kills Chances for Anti-Crime Bill, N.Y. TIMES, March 20,
1992, at A20 (describing the effect of election-year politics on the crime bill).
76. See, e.g., Code de procedure p~nale, art. 689-1 (France), reprinted in FRENCH LAw 9-122
(George A. Bermann, Henry P. deVries & Nina M. Galston eds., 1990); Penal Code of the Federal
Republic of Germany, S 7, in 28 THE AMERICAN SERIES O1: FOREIGN PENAL CODES 50 (Joseph J.
Darby trans., 1987) [hereinafter PENAL CODES]; G. LEROY CERTomA, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
90-91 (1985) (citing Italian Penal Code provisions); Greek Penal Code, art. 7(1), in 18 PENAL
CODES at 39 (Nicholas B. Lolis trans., 1973); Austrian Penal Act, § 40, in 12 PENAL CODES 31-32
(Norbert D. West & Samuel I. Shuman trans., 1966); Turkish Criminal Code, art. 6, in 9 PENAL
CODES at 14 (Orhan Sepici & Mustafa Ovacik trans., 1965).
Many other states, however, continue to reject the passive personality principle. See, e.g.,
Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46, S 6(2) (1993) (no jurisdiction for crimes committed
outside Canada); 18 U.S.C. S 7(7) (1988) (claiming territorial jurisdiction only when the offense
occurs outside the jurisdiction of any nation); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 402 cmt.
g (noting that passive personality has not gained wide acceptance for ordinary crimes).
77. See Blakesley, supra note 56, at 938.
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national law endorsing passive personality jurisdiction. On the other hand,
it seems equally doubtful that state practice has generated a rule of
customary international law barring passive personality jurisdiction. 78
In sum, passive personality jurisdiction has not yet become a
significant part of either United States or international law, except that it
has won some acceptance as a means of prosecuting terrorists. The next
part of this Article considers whether customary international law should
recognize some form of passive personality jurisdiction, and, if so, to what
extent. Part IV asks whether passive personality jurisdiction could be
incorporated into United States law.
III. PASSIVE PERSONALITY JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW
The passive personality principle has traditionally been criticized for at
least three reasons. First, passive personality jurisdiction is thought to
intrude too deeply on the sovereignty of other states, such as the state in
which the crime occurred or the offender's home state, both of which
arguably have a more direct connection to the crime than the victim's home
state.79 Second, passive personality has been criticized on the grounds
that it deprives potential defendants of notice that their conduct is criminal,
since the applicable rule of criminal law will depend on the victim's
nationality.0 Under this view, it is unfair to subject a defendant to the
substantive criminal law of the victim's home state, since no one can be
presumed to know the criminal law of a state thousands of miles away.
Third, critics of passive personality jurisdiction argue that it is impractical.
They point out that many extradition treaties will not permit rendition of
a fugitive to the victim's home state, and, in any event, that the victim's
home state will be unable to prosecute for lack of fresh evidence and
78. See discussion infra part V.
79. See, eg., Letter of Janet G. Mullins, supra note 6 (arguing that passive personality
jurisdiction "interferes unduly with the application of local law by local authorities"); Report on
The Cutting Case, supra note 6, at 824 (arguing that the exercise of passive personality jurisdiction
would be "a work of supererogation" and that it might "interfer[e] in a matter which, as the law
of the place provided for it, would most properly be left alone.").
80. See, e.g., Report on the Cutting Case, supra note 6, at 840 (arguing that passive personality
jurisdiction is unfair because it exposes individuals to an "indefinite responsibility").
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witnesses.8 ' This part of the Article takes up each of these contentions in
turn.
A. Intrusion on Sovereignty
States have traditionally regarded territorial jurisdiction as the most
important head of jurisdiction. A state may freely regulate the conduct of
individuals within its own borders, subject only to the limits of internation-
al human rights law.82 In a sense, then, any attempt by another state to
exercise jurisdiction over persons within a state's borders could be perceived
as an intrusion on sovereignty, since such an attempt may interfere with the
state's exercise of its own jurisdiction. 3 States are particularly likely to
view an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction as "intrusive" if the conduct
in question is not criminal in the state in which it occurred8 4
Nationality jurisdiction, for example, is a generally accepted basis for
prosecution,8 5 but not when the conduct is not criminal in the state in
which it occurred. Thus came the outcry over Ireland's attempt to apply
its own laws criminalizing abortion to an Irish national seeking an abortion
in England.86 To be sure, states might acquiesce in a nationality-based
extraterritorial prosecution for conduct generally recognized as
criminal-murder or rape, for example-even if the host state failed to
criminalize that conduct. Indeed, there is a trend away from making "dual
criminality" a prerequisite to international judicial assistance in criminal
81. See, e.g., Cowen, supra note 36, at 143-44 (arguing that antiterrorism statutes founded
on passive personality jurisdiction will encounter extradition problems); cf Blakesley, supra note
43 at 739, 744-45 (arguing that dual criminality requirement in extradition extends to jurisdic-
tion).
82. See Note, Constructing the State Extraterritorially: Jurisdictional Discourse, the National
Interest, and Transnational Norms, 103 HARV. L REv. 1273, 1276 (1990).
83. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 403, reporters' note 8, ("the exercise of criminal...
jurisdiction in relation to acts committed in another state may be perceived as particularly
intrusive.") (citing Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App.Cas. 547, 630).
84. See 2 IrrERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 15 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds.,
1973) (discussing offenses against a state committed outside its boundaries); cf. Treaty of
Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. III(1)(a), 28 U.S.T. 227, 229 (requiring "double
criminality" for extradition).
85. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 402(2).
86. William E. Schmidt, Girl, 14, Raped and Pregnant Is Caught in Web of Irish Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at Al. The Irish Supreme Court eventually ruled that the fourteen-year-old
could travel to England for the abortion without fear of Irish prosecution. James F. Clarity, Irish
High Court Explains Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1992, at A8 (noting that "the high court feared
she would kill herself if they refused").
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matters.8 7 In general, however, "dual criminality" remains an essential
element of international extradition,88 and it is likely to remain important
in assessing the propriety of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Like nationality jurisdiction, passive personality jurisdiction will usually
be viewed as intrusive when dual criminality is lacking. If State X seeks to
prosecute a national of State Y for committing a crime against a national
of X in the territory of Y, and the conduct is not criminal in State Y, then
Y's national will be punished for conduct that would normally be lawful in
Y's home state. State Y is likely to regard such a prosecution as undermin-
ing its own criminal justice system and as blurring the accepted standards
of conduct within State Y. State X would essentially ask State Y to acqui-
esce in a prosecution of Y's national for conduct in Y's ter-
ritory-blasphemy, for example-that might seem trivial or even constitu-
tionally protected to Y. Most states would probably deem this result
unacceptable. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the international legal
system will ever approve of passive personality jurisdiction unless there is
at least some element of "dual criminality" built into it.
A much more difficult question is whether international law might
accept passive personality jurisdiction that is conditioned on dual
criminality. Some states have already adopted this form of the jurisdic-
tion. 9 Moreover, states have long accepted that some forms of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction do not intrude on sovereignty, or at least not to an
intolerable extent.90
Nonetheless, many states apparently consider passive personality
jurisdiction to be more intrusive than nationality or territorial jurisdiction,
even if exercised when the conduct is criminal in the state in which the
crime occurred. 91 This view of "intrusiveness" seems to turn on states'
assessments of the interests served by a particular exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The international community has perceived that a state has a
87. See, e.g., SENATE Comm. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
COOPERATION TREATY WITH MEXICO, S. EXEC. REP. No. 9, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1989)
(noting that U.S.-Mexico MLAT does not contain dual-criminality requirement); SENATE CoMM.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TREATY WITH CANADA ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1989) (similar).
88. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. III(l)(a) 28 U.S.T. 227, 229.
89. See, e.g., Norwegian Penal Law, S 12(4)(a)-(b), in 3 PENAL CODES, supra note 76, at 16
(Haraold Schjoldager and Finn Backer trans., 1961); Polish Penal Code, art 114, 5 1, in 19 PENAL
CODES, supra note 76, at 33, 63 (William S. Kenney & Tadeusz Sadowski trans., 1973).
90. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 402 (describing the different bases of
extraterritorial jurisdiction).
91. See, e.g., Letter of Janet G. Mullins, supra note 6 (criticizing proposal to establish passive
personality jurisdiction over serious common crimes that are punishable in virtually all states).
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more valid interest in regulating the conduct of its nationals than in
regulating foreigners who harm its nationals abroad, and thus has viewed
passive personality jurisdiction as a less compelling basis than nationality.
And the international community often puts the interests of the state in
which the crime occurred ahead of either the state of the offender or the
state of the victim, 92 apparently on the grounds that the host state's
interest in preserving order at home outweighs the interests of either the
victim's or offender's home state in regulating conduct abroad.
Territorial jurisdiction usually serves stronger state interests than
passive personality jurisdiction. Regulation of criminal conduct within a
state's own territory is obviously crucial to the maintenance of order within
that state. It has been argued, however, that this interest in social order is
also served by passive personality and other forms of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. "If disturbance of the legal order within a State's territory is
considered the most persuasive reason for penal jurisdiction, such
disturbance may be found in the presence unpunished of an offender who
has committed crime elsewhere." 93 But even if a state does have some
"social-order" interest in prosecuting an offender found in its territory for
a crime committed elsewhere, it obviously has a stronger interest in
prosecuting such an offender for a crime committed inside the state's own
territory.
Nationality jurisdiction also serves significant state interests.
Nationality jurisdiction does little to maintain order at home, except insofar
as vigorous enforcement of a state's criminal laws abroad has an incidental
deterrent effect at home. Rather, nationality-based criminal jurisdiction
reflects the need to maintain good relations with other states-both by
deterring conduct by its own nationals that reflects poorly on the state
abroad, and by ensuring that nationals do not go unpunished in the event
that they escape prosecution by the state in which they commit a crime. A
state's national might escape prosecution by fleeing home and thwarting
extradition, or the national might be a diplomat entitled to immunity from
the receiving state's criminal laws. That national's home state can protect
its reputation and its relations with other states by exercising nationality-
based criminal jurisdiction itself. In at least some cases, then, nationality
jurisdiction might serve another important state interest: the smooth
operation of its foreign relations.94
When resolving jurisdictional disputes, states sometimes put nationality
jurisdiction on a par with territorial jurisdiction. In some cases, the
92. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
93. Harvard Research, supra note 4, at 580.
94. See generally Watson, supra note 1, at 44-52.
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offender's home state will exercise jurisdiction even though the state in
which the crime occurred is also willing to prosecute. This occurs most
frequently when the state in which the crime occurred requests extradition
of the offender from the offender's home state. Many bilateral extradition
treaties provide that the requested state is not required to extradite its own
nationals, 95 and in many circumstances the requested state has enacted
into municipal law nationality-based criminal jurisdiction.96 On the other
hand, many states do regard the requesting state's interest as paramount,
and they insist that states extradite their own nationals rather than exercise
nationality-based criminal jurisdiction. Such requesting states consider
regulation of conduct within its own borders home more important than
regulation of a state's nationals abroad.97
Passive personality jurisdiction does not clearly serve any of the
interests furthered by territorial or nationality jurisdiction. Unlike
territorial jurisdiction, it does little to promote social order at home, except
insofar as vigorous enforcement of a state's laws abroad has a marginally
deterrent effect at home. Unlike nationality jurisdiction, it does not
promote better foreign relations by taking responsibility for the misdeeds
of a state's nationals abroad.
Passive personality does, however, further a third important state
interest: the protection of a state's nationals abroad. By deterring crime
against a state's nationals abroad, passive personality jurisdiction
presumably protects them from physical and economic harm. Protection
of a state's nationals abroad, while perhaps not as fundamental as the
maintenance of social order or peaceful foreign relations, is a legitimate
interest of that state.98  Virtually every state in the world provides
consular services to its nationals abroad. Consuls are designed to ensure
that a state's nationals are not physically mistreated while abroad, discrim-
95. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, Oct. 29, 1883, U.S.-Lux., 23 Stat. 808. Many civil-law
states refuse to extradite their nationals, opting instead to prosecute them for crimes committed
overseas. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 836 (Louis Henkin, Richard C.
Pugh, Oscar Schacter & Hans Smit eds., 2d ed. 1986) (citing examples from French and German
law); SATTA DEvA BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRAcrcE 94 (1968).
96. See, e.g., Extradition Act of 1988, 1 AusTL. ACTS P. No. 4, S 45 (1988).
97. The United States, for example, has consistently called for states to extradite their own
nationals. See, e.g., JOHN B. MooRE, 1 A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION
S140, at 174 n.2 (1891) (describing United States diplomatic efforts to persuade Switzerland to
agree to extradition of its nationals). See generally ROBERT W. RArUSE, THE EXTRADITION OF
NATIONALS, reprinted in 24 ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES No. 2 (1939).
98. See BORCHARD, supra note 3, S 13, at 25.
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inated against in trade or employment, or abused in foreign prisons. Many
of these services (prison visitation, for example) are mandated by treaty.99
It might be argued, however, that states have little valid interest in
passive personality jurisdiction because it will have scant deterrent effect.
An individual contemplating a crime may have no idea of the nationality
of his victim, and hence no idea of what criminal law might attach to his
conduct. Even if the offender does know his victim's nationality, he may
not be familiar with the law of the victim's home state. Indeed, the
offender is much more likely to be familiar with the law of his own home
state, or perhaps the law of the state in which the crime occurs, than with
the law of the victim's home state. In addition, the state in which the crime
occurred is much more likely to prosecute than the victim's home state,
even if passive personality jurisdiction becomes widely accepted. Thus the
deterrent effect of prosecutions by the victim's home state will be diluted
even further.
Still, passive personality's uncertain deterrent effect protects nationals
better than no deterrent at all. That it serves a valid interest imperfectly is
not in itself fatal. Territorial jurisdiction obviously does not deter perfectly.
Also, while nationality jurisdiction may promote good foreign relations in
some cases, it may injure them in others, as when the state in which the
crime occurred wishes to prosecute. Moreover, the very uncertainty of the
passive personality remedy may enhance its deterrent effect. If a potential
offender is unsure of his victim's nationality, and if he is generally aware
that harming some foreigners carries grave penalties, he may choose not to
take that risk that he is wrong about the identity of the victim. Even if he
knows his victim's nationality, he may be only vaguely aware that crimes
against some foreigners are harshly punished by their home states. Again,
his uncertainty may persuade him to choose another, less risky target.
Passive personality jurisdiction, then, serves an important state
interest-protection of its own nationals abroad-and does so with at least
some efficacy. It is difficult to see, then, why nationality jurisdiction is not
considered "intrusive" but passive personality jurisdiction is. In both cases,
a state furthers its legitimate interests by applying its own law to conduct
in another state's territory. It is far from dear that a state has a stronger
interest in exercising nationality jurisdiction than passive personality
jurisdiction. Nationality jurisdiction may occasionally enhance the
reputation of a state by ensuring that its nationals do not literally get away
with murder on foreign soil, just as passive personality may occasionally
deter a terrorist or violent criminal from targeting a national of a particular
99. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36(1)(c), 21 U.S.T. 77,
101, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292 (providing for prison visitation).
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state. But even if nationality jurisdiction serves more fundamental interests,
passive personality clearly serves valid interests as well.
The traditional preference for nationality jurisdiction may also reflect
a sense that states should proceed more cautiously when seeking to
prosecute foreigners. But this objection does not explain why other forms
of jurisdiction over aliens-protective jurisdiction, territorial-effects
jurisdiction, and universal jurisdiction-are acceptable while passive
personality jurisdiction is not. If the United States can prosecute two
British nationals for conspiring in London to import marijuana into the
United States, it should also be able to prosecute a British national for
murdering a United States citizen in London-though in both cases the
English authorities should have the first crack at prosecution. If in either
case the English do prosecute, treaty law would bar the extradition of the
offender to the United States for retrial on the same offenses.100
One last question is whether passive personality jurisdiction "intrudes"
on the sovereignty of the offendeds home state. The offender, after all, may
not be a national of the state in which the crime occurred. Again, this
question may turn largely on whether the offender's home state wishes to
prosecute at all. If not, it is again difficult to see how passive personality
jurisdiction "intrudes" on that state's sovereignty. Prosecution by the
victim's home state in such circumstances hardly seems likely to undermine
the criminal justice system of the offender's home state.
If, on the other hand, the offender's home state does wish to prosecute,
then the victim's home state has a much weaker case indeed. The respective
state interests may be roughly equivalent. The offender's home state has a
valid interest in deterring acts by its nationals that damage its reputation
abroad, and perhaps in demonstrating to the state in which the crime
occurred that it will take responsibility for the misconduct of its nationals
abroad; the victim's home state, for its part, has a valid interest in
protecting its nationals.101 But it is probably more fair to the defendant
to give preference to the defendant's home state, for the defendant can be
presumed to be aware of his own country's law-or at least can be
presumed to be more familiar with his own country's law than with the law
of the victim's state.102
100. See Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. V(1)(a), 28 U.S.T. 227 (non bis
in idem clause, the treaty equivalent to double jeopardy).
101. Again, however, prosecution by the offender's home state fairly closely approximates the
deterrent effect achieved by prosecution by the victim's home state, whereas prosecution by the
victim's home state will not serve the (admittedly attenuated) interest of the offender's home state
in demonstrating that it will control the conduct of its nationals abroad in the future.
102. Fairness to the defendant is discussed infra part III.B.
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This rationale for favoring the offender's home state would weaken
considerably if a particular defendant expressed preference for trial in the
victim's home state. Even then, however, the international community
would likely still favor the offender's home state, presumably for the same
reasons that extradition treaties permit states to deny extradition of their
nationals regardless of the defendant's preferences. There is some sense,
particularly among civil-law states, that a state should have the paramount
right to decide when to deprive its own citizens of liberty, and that this
right transcends even the right of states to enforce violations of law within
their own territory. 0 3
In sum, the exercise of passive personality jurisdiction might reasonably
be accorded a lower priority than the exercise either of territorial jurisdic-
tion by the state in which the crime occurred or the exercise of nationality
jurisdiction by the offender's home state.'0 4 But if neither the state in
which the crime occurred nor the offender's home state prosecutes, they
should not have reason to complain if the victim's home state then decides
to prosecute. Such a scheme of priorities would obviously depend on some
reliable means of ensuring that the victim's state does not undertake a
prosecution before the state in which the crime occurred or the offender's
home state have made their intentions dear. But those two states can
presumably communicate their intention to the foreign ministry of the
victim's home state or, in an extreme case in which their intentions are
ignored, directly to the court before which the defendant is to be tried. In
principle, however, there is no reasonable basis for a state that does not
plan to prosecute an offender to object to another state's exercise of passive
personality jurisdiction over that offender. Such an exercise of jurisdiction
does not "intrude" on any state's sovereignty because it would not conflict
with any state's exercise of sovereign powers. On the contrary, the exercise
of jurisdiction in such circumstances ensures prosecution of a crime that
would otherwise go unpunished. Surely the international community as a
whole has an interest in prosecuting such crimes.
Thus, passive personality jurisdiction will not "intrude" unduly on
foreign sovereignty if it is exercised only when the state in which the crime
occurred considers the conduct in question criminal but does not prosecute.
If limited in this way, passive personality jurisdiction seems no more
intrusive than nationality jurisdiction and other accepted forms of
jurisdiction. But it is possible that passive personality jurisdiction unfairly
103. See INTERNATIONAL LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 95; BEDI, supra note 95
(both noting that civil-law states prefer to prosecute rather than extradite their own nationals).
104. See 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 29 (M. CherifBassiouni & Ved
P. Nanda eds., 1973) (arguing that passive personality should be a "residuary" basis for jurisdic-
tion).
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punishes defendants who are unaware of the law of the victim's home state.
This issue will be discussed next.
B. Fairness to the Defendant
More than one hundred years ago, the United States Department of
State expressed opposition to passive personality jurisdiction on the grounds
that it would be unfair to criminal defendants. It would subject individuals
"not merely to a dual, but to an indefinite responsibility"-a responsibility
to obey foreign laws as well as United States laws. 05 The State Depart-
ment apparently still adheres to this view, 05 as do some commenta-
tors. 0 7 If passive personality jurisdiction becomes the law, it is argued,
then an individual who never leaves her home town will nonetheless be
exposed to the criminal laws of other states every time he or she encounters
a foreigner, since the foreigner's home state can punish what it defines as
crimes against that foreigner. It is unfair, the argument runs, to presume
that an individual knows the law of every foreign state in the world. In this
view, it may also be unfair to presume that the individual knows the
nationality of the potential victim. If the United States prosecuted an
Italian for a transgression against an American in Rome that was criminal
in the United States but lawful in Italy, the Italian could well argue that she
had no fair notice that her conduct was criminal.
In reality, it is unusual for conduct to be lawful in one state but
criminal in another. Extradition treaties themselves are premised on the
notion that different legal systems punish largely the same array of conduct
as criminal. Still, some states' laws go further than others. The United
States has laws on narcotics, money-laundering, racketeering, environmental
crimes, and terrorism that are not found in other legal systems.'0 8
United States rape laws may be broader than their equivalents in other
countries. Similarly, other states may have criminal laws that are alien to
the United States system, such as laws prohibiting certain speech or
religious practice. Even if two states both treat certain conduct as criminal,
they may punish it in radically different ways. Thus the slaughter of a
neighbor's cow in New Hampshire may carry less punishment than a
similar act in New Delhi.
Nonetheless, these different standards of crime and punishment have
not prevented states from making most serious crimes subject to
105. Report on the Cutting Case, supra note 6, at 840.
106. See Letter of Janet G. Mullins, supra note 6 (criticizing passive personality jurisdiction).
107. See, eg., Lowenfeld, supra note 54, at 892-93; Cowen, supra note 36, at 139-44.
108. See 2 M. CGnRI BAsslouNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 412 (1986).
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extradition. Most extradition treaties, particularly the older ones, list those
crimes for which extradition will be granted; usually the list consists of
violent crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, assault, and kidnapping, as
well as crimes against property such as theft, fraud, and embezzlement. 10 9
Such treaties no doubt reflected each party's research into the other's
criminal law, and a conclusion that the quantum of punishment the other
party assigned to each crime was acceptable. More recent extradition trea-
ties sometimes oblige the parties to extradite for any felony-that is, any
offense punishable in both countries by more than a year's imprison-
ment.110 These treaties thus combine a requirement of "dual criminali-
ty"-that the crime be punishable in both states-with a requirement of a
minimum level of punishment. In this way states can ensure that they do
not participate in a prosecution resulting in punishment that seems
disproportionately harsh or lenient.
The same principles could be applied to passive personality jurisdic-
tion. States could agree, by treaty or custom, to prosecute crimes against
their own nationals only if the crime was punishable by at least a year's
imprisonment in the state in which the crime took place. An individual
could therefore be prosecuted only for conduct already criminal in the state
in which it occurs. Such an individual could not complain of a lack of
notice that the conduct was criminal.
Common sense would also suggest that passive personality jurisdiction
be limited to serious crimes punishable by significant jail terms in both
states-perhaps crimes of violence such as murder, rape, and felonious
assault. Such a rule would minimize the possibility that a defendant would
be punished severely in the victim's home state for conduct that is a minor
infraction at home.
In addition, states could agree not to exercise passive personality
jurisdiction if the offender was prosecuted by either the state in which the
crime occurred or the offender's home state. This rule, of course, already
has an analog in domestic double-jeopardy provisions and in the non bis
in idem provisions of extradition treaties, which may bar extradition if the
fugitive has already been prosecuted by any state for the same offense."'
A separate question is whether this non bis in idem doctrine should apply
when the state in which the crime occurred and the offender's home state
both exercise their prosecutorial discretion not to institute criminal
109. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, April 18, 1911, U.S.-EI Sal., art. II, 7 Bevans 507, 508;
Convention Relating to Extradition, Aug. 11, 1874, U.S.-Ottoman Empire, art. II, 10 Bevans 642,
643 (still in force between the United States and Egypt); Convention of Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962,
U.S.-Israel, art. II, 14 U.S.T. 1707, 1708.
110. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, art. II, T.I.A.S. No. 10,837, at 5.
111. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. V(1)(a), 28 U.S.T. 227,230.
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proceedings. Under traditional double-jeopardy and non bis in idem
doctrine, such a decision would not bar prosecution by another
sovereign. 12 In practice, this means a state may need to acquiesce in a
prosecution it would not have brought itself. Such acquiescence might be
particularly uncomfortable if the defendant were a national of the state
foregoing prosecution, or if there seemed to be little evidence to support a
prosecution.
This problem is not unique to passive personality jurisdiction; it
inheres in all forms of concurrent jurisdiction. There are several means a
state can utilize to prevent an extraterritorial prosecution of which it
disapproves. First, if the offender is within its territory, it can decline to
extradite for lack of evidence, or because the extradition request is for a
"political offense," or perhaps because the offender is a national of the
requested state.113 Second, it can decline to provide judicial assistance
for the foreign prosecution on many of the same grounds.1" 4 Third, it
can bring to bear political and economic pressure on the offending
state.115 Finally, if the foreign prosecution violates the accused's human
rights, any state can resort to the remedies available under international
human rights law.116
112. See id. (non bis in idem clause applicable only to previous "acquittal or conviction," not
to prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute).
113. See, e.g., id. art. IV (state may deny extradition absent assurances from requesting state
that death penalty will not apply); id. art. V(c)(i), as amended by Supplementary Treaty of
Extradition, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K., art, I, S. ExEc. Doc. 17, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 15 (political
offense).
114. See, e.g., Treaty with the United Kingdom Concerning the Grand Cayman Islands
Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, U.S.-U.K., art. 3(2)(b), in
S. TREATY Doc. No. 8, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1987) (providing no obligation to assist when
request relates to political offense); id. art. 3(1)(b) (providing obligation only for crimes
punishable by more than one year's imprisonment).
115. This pressure may even include resort to the United Nations Security Council, which
has recently taken an interest in Libya's refusal to extradite two men implicated in the bombing
of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1989. See U.N.S.C. Res. 731, 3033d mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/Res. 731 (1992), reprinted in Paul Lewis, Libya Unyielding Despite U.N. Demand, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1992, at A8 (obliging Libya to "respond fully and effectively" to extradition
requests of United States and United Kingdom).
116. A state can, for example, file suit to enjoin such a prosecution in the International Court
of Justice or in regional human rights tribunals such as the European Court of Human Rights.
See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct H.R. (ser. A) (1989) reprinted in I I Eur. H.R.
Rep. 439 (1989) (enjoining extradition of fugitive from the United Kingdom to the United States
because his human rights would be violated on death row in a Virginia prison). Alternatively, a
state can bring the matter to the attention of United Nations or regional human rights authorities.
Other remedies include economic sanctions and perhaps, in extreme situations, humanitarian
intervention. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 703 comments & reporters' notes
(describing remedies for human rights violations).
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At bottom, fear of corrupt foreign prosecutions is probably what
motivates much hostility toward passive personality jurisdiction, though
states are too polite to say so to one another. Certainly it is a legitimate
concern. Still, the international community has already acquiesced in other
forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction that pose just as much a risk of abuse.
Any state can declare that conduct violates "universal" norms, that it
implicates the state's "national security," or that the conduct has "effects"
within the state's territory, and therefore apply the protective principle of
jurisdiction. Such a state does not need to rely on passive personality
jurisdiction to violate the human rights of foreigners; plenty of other
jurisdictional pretexts already exist. Recognizing passive personality
jurisdiction will not make it appreciably easier for states to violate the
human rights of foreign nationals because they can do so already. The real
problem with trumped-up prosecutions is not how jurisdiction is defined;
it is that the prosecution itself violates the accused's human rights. Such
prosecutions are already prohibited by international human rights law." 7
Denial of extradition and judicial assistance to such states, together with
political and economic sanctions, may prevent prosecutions of this ilk;
manipulating otherwise valid bases for jurisdiction will not.
In sum, passive personality jurisdiction can be fair to the defendant,
but only if applied to defendants who have reason to know their conduct
constitutes a serious crime in the victim's state. For this reason, passive
personality jurisdiction should be limited to serious crimes punishable by
significant jail terms in both the victim's and the defendant's states. Such
a rule would put the defendant on notice, minimize the possibility of
disproportionate punishment, and ensure that serious offenders do not
evade prosecution altogether.
The next part considers whether passive personality jurisdiction is
inherently impractical.
C. Evidentiary and Logistical Objections to Passive Personality Jurisdiction
A third criticism of passive personality jurisdiction is that it will not
work. This objection has a number of components. First, a state seeking
to exercise such jurisdiction might not be able to obtain custody of the
defendant because extradition treaties often do not extend to prosecutions
117. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 9-10, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
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by the victim's home state.118 Second, if an otherwise uninterested state
is faced with competing extradition requests from three states seeking to
exercise territorial, nationality, and passive personality jurisdiction
respectively, the requested state will usually give preference to the states
asserting territorial and nationality jurisdiction.'" 9 Finally, even if the
victim's home state can circumvent extradition problems, it will still face
evidentiary obstacles such as the attendance of witnesses from abroad.' 20
None of these objections is fatal. The first, relating to the applicability
of extradition treaties, is hardly insurmountable. True, a number of
extradition treaties apply only to crimes committed within the "jurisdiction"
of the requesting state,12' a term that has been interpreted to include
widely accepted forms of jurisdiction, such as territorial jurisdiction, but
not necessarily more exotic forms.122 But the use of the term "jurisdic-
tion" rather than "territory" suggests a broader possible reading. In any
event, if passive personality jurisdiction gained wider acceptance,
presumably the understanding of the term "jurisdiction" might expand as
well. Treaty law permits parties to interpret a treaty by taking into account
any subsequent agreement between the parties on its interpretation or
application, as well as any subsequent practice under the treaty that reflects
the parties' agreement on its application.123 Presumably the parties could
also take into account a change in the customary international law of
passive personality jurisdiction.12 4 Moreover, many bilateral extradition
treaties oblige the requested state to extradite for crimes committed outside
118. See, e.g., Cowen, supra note 36, at 143-44 (arguing that antiterrorism statutes founded
on passive personality jurisdiction will encounter extradition problems); cf Blakesley, supra note
43, at 739, 744-45 (arguing that the dual criminality requirement in extradition extends to
jurisdiction).
119. See Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. X, 28 U.S.T. 227 (providing that
the requested state should consider the nationality of the accused and other factors, but not the
nationality of the victim).
120. See Watson, supra note 1, at 70-76 (describing the evidentiary problems that arise in
any extraterritorial prosecution).
121. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 6, 1909, U.S.-France, 37 Stat. 1526.
122. See, e.g., 6 Whiteman, DIGEST S 20, at 889-99 (1968) (citing examples). See generally
Blakesley, supra note 43, at 743-53, 754-60 (describing "special use" of the dual criminality
doctrine that extends to jurisdiction); In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 281,283 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1873) (No.
13,562) (applying the double criminality rule to jurisdiction).
123. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(a)-(b), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
The United States is not party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties but regards
it as customary international law. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 78 (1991); Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United
States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L 281 (1988).
124. See Vienna Convention, supra note 123, art. 31(3)(c) (providing that the parties shall
also take into account relevant rules of international law).
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the territory of the requesting state if the law of the requested state would
permit prosecution in reciprocal circumstances. 125 Such treaties obvious-
ly permit the parties to define for themselves which bases for jurisdiction
are acceptable. If need be, states can amend existing extradition treaties to
broaden their applicability,126 or, more likely, they can amend their
domestic implementing legislation to permit extradition to states exercising
passive personality jurisdiction. 127 In short, the "jurisdiction" provisions
of bilateral extradition treaties do not present an insuperable obstacle to
the exercise of passive personality jurisdiction.
The second "practical" concern is that, given a choice, states will
extradite to states asserting territorial or nationality jurisdiction rather than
to a state asserting passive personality jurisdiction. Many bilateral
extradition treaties contain a clause providing guidance on how to choose
among competing extradition requests. Typically this "competing requests"
clause provides that the requested state should consider the place in which
the crime occurred and the nationality of the offender-the bases for
territorial and nationality jurisdiction, respectively-but does not mention
the nationality of the victim.' 28 It could be argued that this omission
suggests that the victim's home state can never resort to extradition.
Such an interpretation would go too far. A "competing requests"
clause certainly does suggest a hierarchy among extradition re-
quests-typically, the state asserting territorial jurisdiction has the strongest
claim to extradition, and perhaps that the state asserting nationality
125. See 6 Whiteman, supra note 122, S 20, at 891 (citing examples).
126. States sometimes do so with a supplementary bilateral extradition treaty. See, e.g.,
Supplementary Treaty Concerning Extradition, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K., 24 I.L.M. 1105.
Increasingly, however, states are relying on multilateral treaties to amend their bilateral extradition
treaties. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, art. 8(1), 24 U.S.T. 565, 571, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (providing that certain
terrorist offenses "shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty
existing between Contracting States").
127. The United States, for example, has recently amended its extradition statute to permit
extradition of United States nationals even when the applicable extradition treaty does not clearly
authorize extradition of nationals. See 18 U.S.C. S 3196 (West Supp. 1991) (permitting the
United States to extradite nationals even if "the applicable treaty or convention does not obligate
the United States to extradite its citizens"). This provision apparently responds to Valentine v.
United States ex reL Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8-9 (1936), which held that the Constitution does not
permit extradition of United States nationals pursuant to discretionary treaty language, but implied
that obligatory language in a treaty or statute would suffice.
128. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. X, 28 U.S.T. 227, 232
(providing that the requested state should consider the nationality of the accused and other
factors, but not the nationality of the victim).
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jurisdiction is next in line. 29 But these "competing requests" clauses do
not bar extradition to a state asserting passive personality jurisdiction when
it is the only state seeking extradition-that is, when there are no competing
requests. In such circumstances the relevant provision is instead the
"jurisdiction" provision discussed above,130 which limits extradition to
cases within the "jurisdiction" of the requesting state.
When there are competing requests, the typical "competing request"
clause does imply that the requested state should pick the states claiming
territorial and perhaps nationality jurisdiction over the state claiming
passive personality jurisdiction. Such a result is generally welcome. It con-
forms with this Article's proposal that passive personality jurisdiction be
treated as a residual form of jurisdiction, to be exercised only if no state
claims territorial or nationality jurisdiction. 131 The states claiming more
conventional forms of jurisdiction usually have a strong interest in
prosecution, and the state claiming territorial jurisdiction will undoubtedly
be in the best position to gather witnesses and evidence.
Nevertheless, "competing requests" clauses do not absolutely forbid a
requested state to choose to extradite to a state asserting passive personality
jurisdiction rather than a state asserting territorial or nationality jurisdic-
tion. Instead, the typical clause provides that the requested state "may"
take into account factors such as the place of the offense and the nationality
of the offender.' 32 Although a requested state would normally extradite
to the state asserting territorial or perhaps nationality jurisdiction, on
occasion the requested state might have good reason to prefer the state
asserting passive personality jurisdiction-for example, if the other states did
not evince a sincere desire to prosecute, or if they intended to violate the
offender's human rights.
Extradition treaties, then, will not always stand in the way of a
prosecution founded on passive personality jurisdiction. In some cases, of
course, the victim's home state can obtain custody of the fugitive without
129. Some "competing requests" clauses even seem to ignore nationality jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Treaty of Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., art. 13(2), 27 U.S.T. 983, 993 (mentioning
place in which the offense occurred, seriousness of offense, and dates of competing requests, but
not nationality of offender or victim). Still others simply provide that the requested state "shall
decide" among the competing requests. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex.,
art. 16, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5070.
130. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
131. See supra part IIL.A (describing proposed hierarchy of jurisdiction).
132. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., art. 13(2), 27 U.S.T. 983, 993;
Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. X, 28 U.S.T. 227, 232 (requested state shall
make its decision "having regard" to "all the circumstances," "including" place of the offense,




resort to extradition at all. The fugitive may, for example, be foolish
enough to travel to the victim's home state. Or the fugitive may take
refuge in a state that is willing to deport him or her to the victims home
state. Some states, moreover, are notoriously adept at circumventing
extradition treaties by kidnapping fugitives-an odious practice that has
been consistently tolerated by United States courts. 33
The last practical objection to passive personality jurisdiction relates to
the gathering of evidence. Even if the victim's home state can obtain
custody of the fugitive, that state may have trouble gathering witnesses and
evidence, since they will mostly be located in the state in which the crime
occurred. This logistical objection, as much as anything, explains the
longstanding primacy of territorial jurisdiction. 34
Nonetheless, this objection applies to any form of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, not just passive personality jurisdiction, and yet states routinely
exercise these types of jurisdiction. 135 Existing mechanisms for sharing
of evidence seem no less well-suited for passive personality jurisdiction than
for other theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Letters rogatory, for
example, can be used to request evidence from abroad in support of any
"proceeding" in the United States, regardless of the jurisdictional basis of
that proceeding. 36 Also, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, or MLATs,
oblige states to provide legal assistance for criminal prosecutions regardless
of the jurisdictional basis for the proceeding in the requesting state.
137
In sum, nothing about passive personality jurisdiction makes it
inherently impractical. States can extradite to the victim's home state if
they wish, and they can help by gathering evidence to support prosecutions
based on passive personality jurisdiction.
133. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
Professor Lowenfeld has argued persuasively that the United States courts should re-examine their
traditional indulgence of state-sponsored kidnapping. See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Still
More on Kidnapping, 85 AM. J. INT'L L 655 (1991); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement
Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L 444 (1990). The
Supreme Court had the opportunity to do so last Term. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that kidnapping of doctor from Mexico violated applicable
extradition treaty). The Supreme Court, however, chose to reverse the lower court's decision and
uphold the abduction as a valid exercise of authority by the Executive Branch. United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
134. See Watson, supra note 1, at 54.
135. See id. at 41 & n.1.
136. See 28 U.S.C. S 1782 (1988).
137. See, e.g., Treaty with the United Kingdom Concerning the Grand Cayman Islands
Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, July 9, 1986, U.S.-U.I, arts. 1 & 3, in
S. TREATY Do.. No. 8, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1987) (defining scope of assistance without
reference to jurisdiction). Indeed, some recent MLATs do not even require dual criminality. See
sources cited supra note 87.
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It seems, then, that international law could recognize at least a limited
form of passive personality jurisdiction over serious non-terrorist crimes.
The next part considers whether United States constitutional law permits
the establishment of passive personality jurisdiction by the United States
Congress, and, if so, how such jurisdiction should be implemented.
IV. PASSIVE PERSONALITY JURISDICTION IN UNITED STATES LAW
A. Passive Personality Jurisdiction and the Constitution
The Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise most of the five' 38
internationally-recognized forms of extraterritorial criminal jurisdic-
tion. 139 The power to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies commit-
ted on the high seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations"140 permits
Congress to establish "universal jurisdiction" over certain offenses on the
high seas, as well as some universally condemned crimes such as genocide,
regardless of where they occur.141 The power to regulate foreign com-
merce142 probably justifies most forms of "territorial-effects" jurisdiction,
such as violation of antitrust laws.143 The unenumerated "foreign affairs
power"-that is, the power to legislate in some areas affecting foreign
relations-probably justifies the exercise of "protective jurisdiction," or
extraterritorial jurisdiction over espionage and other crimes that affect the
security of the United States. 44 Similarly, the foreign affairs power
probably permits Congress to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction solely on
the basis of the nationality of the offender, either on the theory that such
jurisdiction is "inherent in sovereignty" or that the misconduct of
Americans abroad can affect United States foreign policy.145 The foreign
commerce power might also support such jurisdiction.146
138. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
139. See Donnelly, supra note 56, at 611 (citing United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255 (1st Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983)).
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 10.
141. See Donnelly, supra note 56, at 606-08 (arguing that the Offenses clause extends to
terrorism).
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 3.
143. See BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 300-02 (discussing the scope of "territorial-effects"
jurisdiction in the context of the "Lotus" case).
144. Congress has an unenumerated "power to deal with foreign affairs," Perez v. Brownell,
356 U.S. 44, 59 (1958), and has used it frequently. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITuTION 74-76 (1972) (describing applications of the foreign affairs power).
145. See Watson, supra note 1, at 68-69.
146. See id. at 65-66.
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It is somewhat more difficult, however, to find a constitutional basis
for the establishment of passive personality jurisdiction-that is, jurisdiction
over common crimes against Americans abroad. Professor Lowenfeld
believes that passive personality jurisdiction may be justified if exercised "in
implementation of an international convention widely adhered to, but
probably not otherwise."147 Congress, on the other hand, appears to
believe it can establish passive personality jurisdiction over terrorist and
non-terrorist crimes. As evidence of this, it has adopted several anti-
terrorism statutes founded at least partly on passive personality jurisdiction,
though it prefers to call this legislation an exercise of protective jurisdic-
tion. 48 It has also seriously considered legislation to establish jurisdic-
tion over simple murders committed against Americans overseas. 149
Unlike nationality jurisdiction, passive personality jurisdiction cannot
easily be said to be "inherent" in sovereignty. Nationality jurisdiction is
universally accepted in the international community; passive personality
jurisdiction is not. 50  Indeed, the United States itself has repeatedly
criticized passive personality jurisdiction.'15
Nevertheless, the unenumerated foreign affairs power probably
authorizes Congress to establish passive personality jurisdiction. Just as
crimes by Americans overseas might sometimes annoy foreign states and
thereby irritate their relations with the United States, 52 crimes against
Americans overseas might themselves injure relations with the United States,
particularly if such crimes are not prosecuted by the state in which they
occur.
147. Lowenfeld, supra note 54, at 893.
148. See 18 U.S.C. S 1203 (1988) (prohibiting the taking of United States hostages abroad);
18 U.S.C. S 2331 (1988) (terrorist crimes against Americans); 132 CoNG. REc. S1382-87 (daily
ed. Feb. 19, 1986) (remarks of Sen. Specter) (describing the bill as an exercise of protective
jurisdiction, not passive personality jurisdiction).
A number of commentators agree that Congress has the power to establish passive
personality jurisdiction, but they do not always point to a specific constitutional source for this
authority. See, e.g., Cowen, supra note 36, at 140; Donnelly, supra note 56, at 611-13.
149. See S. 1241, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S 3202 (passed the Senate on July 11, 1991), 137
CONG. REc. S10,018-19 (daily ed. July 15, 1991).
150. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES S 402
cmt g.
151. See, e.g., Letter of Janet G. Mullins, supra note 6 (criticizing passive personality
jurisdiction); Report on the Cutting Case, supra note 6 (also criticizing passive personality
jurisdiction).
152. See Stephen B. Swigert, Note, Extraterritorial Reach of Proposed Federal Criminal Code,
13 HARv. INT'L L.J. 346, 362 (1972) (arguing that nationality jurisdiction can protect a state's
foreign policy, since it allows a state to prosecute its nationals for crimes committed abroad that
might otherwise go unpunished).
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To be sure, the foreign affairs power seems more relevant to crimes by
Americans than crimes against Americans. In the former situation, an act
by an American national might harm American foreign policy by annoying
a foreign state and diminishing the reputation of the United States in
foreign eyes. Use of the foreign affairs power to prosecute such an act
could be seen as a tool of foreign policy, designed to close a rift in relations
caused by an American actor, particularly if the foreign state is willing but
unable to prosecute.'53 By contrast, a common crime by a foreign
national against an American might anger the United States, but would not
itself diminish the reputation of the United States abroad. The United
States would seek to prosecute the foreign defendant in such a case not to
mend relations with the foreign state, but instead to protect its own
nationals abroad by deterring similar crimes against Americans in the
future. Indeed, an American prosecution in such a case might actually
irritate relations with the foreign state, whether or not it intended to
prosecute.
Nonetheless, the foreign affairs power is probably an appropriate basis
for the establishment and exercise of jurisdiction over foreigners for
common crimes against Americans. A crime against an American overseas
has at least some relation to United States foreign affairs. If nothing else,
it may require an American diplomatic or consular mission to provide
consular services to the victim, thereby expending resources of the
American foreign policy apparatus. More to the point, the United States
and most other countries routinely view certain harms to their nationals as
relevant to foreign policy. If a foreign corporation bilks a United States
national, the United States government will sometimes intercede on his
behalf. If a foreign state's courts refuse to seriously entertain a United
States national's tort claim, the United States government may help him
espouse it. Injuries to a state's nationals are important to policy-makers,
especially if they must answer to voters in democratic elections. If Congress
has a power to legislate on foreign affairs, surely this power includes the
ability to protect United States nationals from harm while abroad.
None of the other constitutional bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction
appears to authorize the establishment of passive personality jurisdiction
over common crimes against Americans. The power to define and punish
crimes on the high seas probably would extend to crimes against Americans
on the high seas, even if they take place on foreign-flag vessels, but
153. The foreign state might be unable to prosecute an American offender for a variety of
reasons. The offender might be a diplomat, entitled to diplomatic immunity; or the offender
might flee to the United States and successfully defend against extradition on the grounds of her
United States nationality, or an extradition treaty may not be in force. See Watson, supra note
1, at 42-43, 55-56.
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obviously would not apply to crimes on foreign soil or in foreign territorial
waters. The power to define and punish crimes against the "Law of
Nations" extends only to war crimes, genocide, and other especially serious
crimes, not to simple murder, assault, and similar common crimes. 54
And the power to regulate foreign commerce-designed to authorize
Congress to regulate foreign trade and other economic intercourse-is only
distantly related to regulation of crimes by foreigners against Americans on
foreign soil.
If Congress can establish jurisdiction over common crimes against
Americans abroad, it almost certainly can establish jurisdiction over terror-
ist crimes against Americans as well. In terrorism cases, the exercise of
passive personality jurisdiction flows naturally from the foreign affairs
power. A terrorist crime against an American abroad affects United States
security interests in a way that a common crime does not. A terrorist
crime, after all, is designed to coerce a state to undertake certain behavior;
it has explicitly political motives, and is directed more at the state than the
individual. Punishment of such a crime dearly serves the foreign relations
of the United States.
The congressional power to define and punish offenses against the law
of nations may also justify congressional efforts to establish jurisdiction
over terrorist crimes against Americans abroad. 55 This justification rings
more of the universal principle than the passive personality principle
because it bases jurisdiction on the nature of the act itself, not the status of
the victim. 156 It is not entirely clear, however, that terrorism is an
"Offense against the Law of Nations." The Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law provides that a state may exercise universal jurisdiction over
piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes,
"and perhaps certain acts of terrorism."'1 7  Nonetheless, the inter-
national community has established a series of strongly-worded multilateral
conventions defining and authorizing punishment of terrorist crimes.' 1
Some of these conventions proceed from the premise that terrorist crimes
154. See Randall, supra note 5, at 839. See discussion supra part IV.A to determine whether
that power might extend to terrorist offenses.
155. See U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power to "define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations").
156. Jurisdiction over terrorists can also be described as an exercise of protective jurisdiction,
designed to protect the security of the state as much as the lives of individual nationals of that
state. In this sense its use resembles an exercise of the unenumerated congressional power to
legislate in foreign affairs. See HENKIN, supra note 144, at 74-76 ("No one knows the reaches of
the Foreign Affairs Power of Congress.").
157. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 404; see also Randall, supra note 5, at 838-39.
158. See generally RESTATEMENr, supra note 1, S 404 reporters' note I (citing terrorism
conventions).
1993]
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
may be of universal concern, regardless of the nationality of the victims,
because they threaten the orderly conduct of foreign relations general-
ly.' 59 These conventions may well have established that terrorist crimes
are "Offences against the Law of Nations" within the meaning of the
Constitution. 160
It does appear, in sum, that the Constitution permits the Congress to
establish jurisdiction over terrorist and serious non-terrorist crimes by
foreigners against Americans abroad. Although regulation of terrorism
against Americans may be more clearly related to the foreign affairs power
than regulation of common crimes against Americans, both serve to protect
United States nationals from harm abroad-a central mission of foreign
policy, and therefore an acceptable application of the congressional power
to legislate on foreign policy. Finally, the congressional power to define
and punish offenses against the law of nations may provide an additional
justification for establishing jurisdiction over terrorists.
The next part considers whether there is a need for passive personality
jurisdiction, and, if so, how the jurisdiction should be implemented.
B. Implementation of Passive Personality Jurisdiction
The conclusion that Congress has the power to establish passive
personality jurisdiction does not, of course, imply that it would be wise to
do so. A threshold question is whether there is a real need for passive-
personality jurisdiction. Most serious crimes against Americans abroad
already can be prosecuted by the state in which the crime occurs. In those
unusual cases in which the host state declines to prosecute, the United
States or some other state often can prosecute using some theory of
jurisdiction other than the passive personality principle. The offender's
home state, for example, may be able to proceed on the basis of nationality
jurisdiction. Also, the United States itself can exercise universal or
protective jurisdiction over terrorist offenses against its nationals, and it can
exercise nationality jurisdiction over common crimes of violence committed
by Americans against other Americans abroad.
159. See, e.g., Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec.
16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 567, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.




Admittedly, there is probably a greater need for a statute on crimes by
Americans abroad rather than crimes against Americans abroad. 161 Every
year United States nationals commit crimes abroad that go unpunished.
Sometimes this is so because of defects in extradition: there are dozens of
states, including allies like the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and
Korea, with which the United States has no extradition treaty.162
Sometimes United States nationals go unpunished because the offender is
a civilian dependent of a member of the United States military, and the
host state expects the United States to prosecute when in fact a United
States courts-martial cannot constitutionally do so and United States
civilian courts lack nationality-based jurisdiction to do so. 163
Still, if a non-American commits a common crime of violence against
an American overseas and the state in which the crime occurs cannot or
will not prosecute, a United States prosecution based on passive personality
may be the only alternative to no prosecution whatsoever. In such a case,
as we have seen, 164 neither international law nor United States constitu-
tional law prevents Congress from establishing jurisdiction over the
offender, except that international law might frown on the exercise of
passive personality jurisdiction in the absence of dual criminality. Even if
international law does not require dual criminality, a prudent Congress
should include such a limitation in any statute establishing passive
personality jurisdiction.
A prudent Congress would also limit passive personality jurisdiction
to serious crimes of violence. The United States obviously lacks the
resources to prosecute foreigners for every pickpocketing and petty larceny
committed against United States nationals abroad. Extradition would be
unavailable for misdemeanors anyway, since extradition treaties apply only
to felonies. Finally, Congress should authorize passive personality
jurisdiction only in those cases in which no other government prosecutes.
161. See generally Watson, supra note 1, at 54-63; Gregory A. McClelland, The Problem of
Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Forces Overseas-Still with Us, 117 MIL. L REv. 153,
180 (1987); U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress of the United States: Some
Criminal Offenses Committed Overseas by DOD Civilians Are Not Being Prosecuted. Legislation is
Needed (Sept. 11, 1979).
162. See, e.g., Oregonian Returns Home After Five Months in Korean Prison, supra note 72
(reporting that the United States could not extradite a fugitive because of the lack of an extradi-
tion treaty between the United States and South Korea and could not prosecute the fugitive for
lack of nationality jurisdiction).
163. See, e.g., Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Judiciary Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985) (statement of
Rep. Bennett) (noting that in 1977 civilians on United States bases abroad committed 422 "major
offenses," and that the host state declined to prosecute 136 of those cases).
164. See discussion supra part IV.A.
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To go further would irritate foreign governments, and it would do nothing
to further the real goal of passive personality jurisdiction: to ensure that
some state prosecutes an individual suspected of a serious crime.
Congress has begun to consider legislation along these lines. In 1991
both houses of Congress passed the "Murder of United States Nationals Act
of 1991,"165 a bill to establish jurisdiction over foreigners who murder
United States nationals on foreign soil. Such prosecutions would require
the Justice Department to certify that no prosecution "has been previously
undertaken by a foreign country for the same act or omission" and would
also require the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, to determine that the offender is no longer present in the state in
which the crime occurred and that that country "lacks the ability to lawfully
secure the person's return."166 This determination would be un-
reviewable.167 The bill would also waive the statutory requirement for
an extradition treaty in those cases in which a foreign government requested
the extradition of a fugitive suspected of murdering a United States national
abroad. 168 Although Congress shelved the proposal, a part of the Om-
nibus Crime Bill, at the end of 1991, Congress plans to take it up again
later.169
This proposed bill has a number of flaws. Most important, it
criminalizes certain crimes againstAmericans abroad without also criminali-
zing crimes by Americans abroad. The legislative history of the bill suggests
that it was inspired in part by the murder of one United States national by
another in Korea in 1988.170 Congress could have created jurisdiction
over such crimes by establishing nationality jurisdiction, a much less
controversial form of jurisdiction than passive personality jurisdiction. By
jumping right to passive personality jurisdiction, Congress runs the risk of
annoying foreign states that might have acquiesced in the establishment of
nationality jurisdiction. By ignoring nationality jurisdiction, Congress
165. S. 1241, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 3201-03 (passed the Senate July 11, 1991), reprinted
in 137 CONG. REc. $1,018-19 (dailyed. July 15, 1991); H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. S 110(a)
(1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REc. H11,686 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (entitled "Foreign Murder
of United States Nationals").
166. S. 1241, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. S 3202(c) (1991).
167. Id.
168. Id. S 3203.
169. See supra notes 74-75 (citing newspaper articles on the politics of the crime bill).
170. See 137 CONG. REc. S4750-51 (daily ed. April 18, 1991) (statement of Sen. Thurmond)
(introducing the bill and arguing that it would help address cases such as the murder of Carolyn




overlooks the significant number of serious crimes by Americans abroad
that go unprosecuted every year.171
The bill's reliance on an unreviewable determination by the Justice
Department is also troubling. A court, not the Justice Department, should
make the findings of fact necessary to determine whether or not subject-
matter jurisdiction exists-in this case, whether the foreign state lacks the
ability to obtain custody of the fugitive. Instead, the bill should require the
Justice Department to simply present evidence on that question, such as the
absence of a relevant extradition treaty or a diplomatic note from the
foreign government itself. The presentation of such evidence might
establish a rebuttable presumption that the foreign state could not obtain
jurisdiction. Commentators have also criticized similar provisions in the
so-called Specter bil 72 on terrorism, 173 but apparently these criticisms
have fallen on deaf ears.
In sum, passive personality jurisdiction is necessary to reach those cases
in which a foreigner commits a common crime of violence against a United
States national abroad. Although there may be a more pressing need for
nationality-based jurisdiction, that form of jurisdiction obviously does not
apply to crimes by aliens against Americans abroad. Passive personality,
however, should be carefully limited to apply only when the conduct is
criminal in the state in which it occurred, and only when that state does
not prosecute. Finally, for practical reasons, the United States should
establish passive personality jurisdiction only over serious crimes of
violence, not more common offenses.
The next part of this Article considers whether international law would
benefit from a more systemic approach to passive personality and other
principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
171. See Watson, supra note 1, at 54-60.
172. S. 1429, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (Terrorism Prosecution Act, enacted as 18 U.S.C.
S 2331 (1984)).
173. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, supra note 54, at 891-92.
Another provision of the passive personality bill, the waiver of the treaty requirement for
extradition, also gives one pause. It permits extradition to all states, regardless of their human-
rights records, and deprives fugitives of important procedural safeguards, such as the right to be
tried only for the crimes for which extradition is requested. A better answer, in principle, would
be simply to negotiate extradition treaties with states currently lacking extradition relations with
the United States. The reality is that negotiation of such treaties takes much time and many
resources. See Watson, supra note 1, at 55-56 (describing obstacles to negotiation of extradition
treaties).
19931
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:1
V. RETHINKING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JURISDICTION:
A SYSTEMIC APPROACH
The proper scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction has not traditionally
been defined by treaty.174 Although some have attempted to codify
international criminal law,175 these efforts have not produced any
definitive treaty or convention defining the powers of states to legislate
extraterritorially or the limits of those powers. Instead, the rules on
jurisdiction are said to spring from customary international law, comity
among nations, or domestic "conflict of laws" principles.17
6
However they are labeled, the principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction
clearly grow out of decentralized sources-the domestic law and practice of
states-rather than a centralized source. This decentralized rule-making has
inevitably generated fierce jurisdictional conflicts even between the closest
of allies.177 The United States, for example, has antagonized European
states by asserting broad jurisdiction over foreign-incorporated subsidiaries
of United States corporations. 178
It is doubtful that such disputes can be avoided by treating the rules
as expressions of customary international law rather than comity or
conflicts principles. In the first place, it is not clear that some of the rules
do qualify as customary international law. The formation of customary law
174. See Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA
L. REv. 665, 675 (1986) (interpreting draft Restatement (Third) provisions on jurisdiction as
resting on customary international law).
175. See, e.g., Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, in Harvard Research,
supra note 4, at 435-51.
176. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 403 cmt. a (describing the "reasonableness"
limitation on jurisdiction as a rule of international law, not comity); Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (pointing to comity); MARK W. JANIS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (1988) (noting that many countries refer to the
jurisdiction rules as "conflict of laws" principles).
Nor is there agreement on the Lotus court's assertion that states have a "wide measure of
discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules." The S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7), at 20. A number of commentators have
criticized this view, and the International Court itself has itself pulled back from it. See generally
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 302-03 (4th ed. 1990) (citing
examples).
177. See THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAws 36-37 (Dieter Lange &
Gary Born eds., 1987) ("Considerable disagreement exists over the extent to which the doctrine
justifies extraterritorial application of national laws.").
178. See, e.g., European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade
with the U.S.S.R., reprinted in 21 IL.M. 891 (1982) (asserting that U.S. regulation of foreign-
incorporated subsidiaries is "not in conformity with recognized principles of international law").
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requires more than a repeated practice by some states. It requires a
"general and consistent" state practice carried out through a sense of legal
obligation, or opinio juris179  There is no "general and consistent"
practice of exercising passive personality jurisdiction now, at least not over
common crimes. Nor is there dear state practice rejecting passive
personality jurisdiction: witness the number of states that have adopted the
theory. 180 States use other principles of jurisdiction, such as territorial-
effects and protective jurisdiction, in very different ways. 81 Even where
there is agreement about a particular basis for jurisdiction, many states
acquiesce in its exercise not out of a sense of obligation (opinio juris) but
out of comity.182
In any event, treating the rules on jurisdiction as customary inter-
national law will not eliminate conflicts of jurisdiction, since customary
international law is a weak form of international law. Although several
defects in customary law are well documented, perhaps most important is
that it is not easily discerned.183 The "practice" of states may be shroud-
ed in diplomatic mist, hidden from view by a cloud of classification and
obfuscation. In this country, the public, Congress, and even many parts of
the Executive Branch may never know whether the United States
government repeatedly objects to or acquiesces in other governments' use
of passive personality jurisdiction. The relevant material may consist of
confidential diplomatic notes or classified internal memoranda.84 A rule
of law that cannot be found is hardly a secure basis for state action.
Customary law has other problems. Even if the practice of a state is
public knowledge, that practice may conflict with other state practice. In
a complex world, it seems to become more and more difficult to find
examples of "general and consistent" state practice-if indeed that practice
can be ascertained at all. Assuming a uniform practice has been estab-
lished, it may then be difficult to change the resulting rule of customary
international law without violating that rule. A paradox of customary law,
179. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 102 cmt. b.
180. See, e.g., supra note 76 (citing various penal codes).
181. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 403, reporters' note 1 (noting the difficulties between
states regarding the exercise of jurisdiction).
182. See JANis, supra note 176, at 259.
183. See Trimble, supra note 174, at 729 (asserting that Congress and even much of the
Executive Branch may be unaware of customary international law because "many of the acts that
comprise state practice would not command attention outside [the State Department]"); cf Note,
Concepts of Law in the Chinese Anti-Crine Campaign, 98 HARV. L REv. 1890, 1890 (1985) ("The
chief problem for students of modem Chinese law has often been one of finding it.") (citations
omitted).
184. See Trinble, supra note 174, at 729-31 (noting that customary international law is
formed and interpreted without much public or even congressional knowledge).
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in other words, is that states sometimes must violate it to change it.185
Citing these and other difficulties, Professor Trimble has argued that United
States courts generally do not and should not apply customary international
law.'86
Multilateral conventions can more easily establish a uniform set of
jurisdictional rules than customary international law or other decentralized
sources of authority. First, multilateral conventions provide a more accessi-
ble form of law than customary international law. In all likelihood, a
convention on jurisdiction would be easier to find and use than an array
of differing domestic conflict-of-laws and comity principles that, if written
at all, are in different languages. Second, a multilateral convention on
jurisdiction could, at least in theory, establish a single set of rules rather
than a hundred different sets of rules. This unifying function has helped
drive international law from custom to treaty in a wide variety of areas,
including the law of human rights, 187 genocide,188 discrimination
against women,18 9 diplomatic and consular relations, 190 the global
environment,' 9 ' and outer space.' 92 Nonetheless, the unifying impulse
has not yet reached the field of jurisdiction.
The prospects for a Convention on Jurisdiction of States are not
bright, at least not now. Disagreements about jurisdiction do not confine
themselves to the "working level" of national governments; they can have
profound political implications. In 1984, for example, the British Secretary
for Trade and Industry criticized American extraterritorial jurisdiction as
"impos[ing] yourlaws on people in other countries, inside their own homes
and their businesses" and said this practice was "the most persistent source
of tension" between the United States and the United Kingdom. 193 For
these reasons a multilateral convention on jurisdiction would probably be
185. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 112 n.3 (1991)
(positing a situation where a state may wish to violate customary international law).
186. See Trimble, supra note 174, at 684-87 (arguing that United States courts rarely apply
customary international law); id. at 707-32 (attacking customary international law as inferior to
treaty law).
187. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
188. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
189. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened
for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33.
190. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
191. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541.
192. Outer Space Treaty, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
193. United Kingdom Department of Trade Press Notice 73, Feb. 8, 1984, quoted in
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Extradition, 36 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 398, 398 (A.V. Lowe & Colin
Warbrick eds., 1987) (emphasis in original).
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riddled with reservations. 194 Still, a convention with reservations would
probably be better than no convention at all.
There are few promising alternatives to negotiating a multilateral
convention or retaining the current system. In recent years some law-
makers and scholars have campaigned for an international criminal court
to handle terrorist crimes and other offenses of international concern. 95
Although such a court would presumably have some power to adjudicate
its own jurisdiction, and thus to apply and perhaps clarify some of the
existing rules of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it would likely confine itself to
universal jurisdiction, since it would be constituted to handle crimes of
universal concern. Presumably it would take no interest in common crimes
of violence, such as murder, as to which territorial, nationality and passive
personality jurisdiction are the relevant norms. Given the opposition to an
international court dedicated to universal crimes, it is unlikely that such a
court's jurisdiction would extend to non-universal crimes, at least not soon
after its creation. Indeed, the prospects for the creation of any such court
remain very uncertain. 96
Consequently, it appears that the international community will
continue to rely on more decentralized sources of law-custom, comity,
conflicts-to define the contours of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.
That reality makes it all the more important that the states take into
account systemic considerations when they make and apply the rules. These
systemic considerations grow out of the collective interest of states in law
enforcement, to which states have repeatedly dedicated themselves through
treaties on crime.
194. Not surprisingly, there is no comprehensive multilateral convention pertaining to
extradition, which raises contentious political issues of its own. Nonetheless, some conventions
regarding particular types of crimes, such as genocide and narcotics trafficking, contain provisions
on extradition. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. VII, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, art. 36(b),
18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 as amended by the Protocol amending the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, March 25, 1972, art. 14, 26 U.S.T. 1439, 976 U.N.T.S. 3. The Montevideo
Convention of 1933 sets forth generally applicable obligations to extradite, and the United States
and a dozen other Latin American states are signatories. However, the Convention has no effect
so long as bilateral extradition treaties are in force, and most American states are party to such
treaties. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. I, VII, 165 L.N.T.S. 19,
25.
195. For more on an international criminal court, see generally BENImN B. FERENCZ, 1 AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CoURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEAcE-A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
AND ANALYSIS (1980) (describing past efforts to establish an international criminal court and
arguing that such a court would help to deter international crimes).
196. See generally Michael P. Scharf, The Jury is Still Out on the Need for an International
Criminal Court 1991 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L 135 (expressing reservations about the proposed
court).
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The international community has developed elaborate multilateral
treaties on virtually all forms of transnational crime, including geno-
cide, 197  torture, 19  war crimes, 199  hostage-taking,20  violence
against internationally protected persons,201 aircraft sabotage,22 nar-
cotics trafficking,203 and trafficking in prostitution. 204 In addition, vir-
tually all states have pledged to cooperate in suppression of crime that does
not cross borders, such as murder, rape, assault, robbery, and arson, by
adopting bilateral extradition treaties that cover most serious crimes. Even
those states without formal extradition relations may use other means, such
as deportation or expulsion, to render fugitives to a prosecuting state.205
Finally, states have entered into bilateral and multilateral treaties providing
for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, such as procuring evidence
and taking depositionfs.206 Further, they have provided such assistance
in the absence of treaties through letters rogatory and other forms of
comity.207 The international community has thus committed itself to the
suppression of all forms of crime through a variety of devices. The
197. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277.
198. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified, Feb. 4, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 535.
199. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Third Geneva Convention); Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Fourth Geneva
Convention) (obliging parties to criminalize and prosecute "grave breaches" of the Convention).
200. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456.
201. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S.
167.
202. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,
24 U.S.T. 565.
203. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended, March 30, 1961, art. 36(b), 18 U.S.T.
1407.
204. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened
for signature Mar. 1, 1980, art. 619 1.L.M. 33, 37.
205. See generally Alona E. Evans, Acquisition of Custody over the International Fugitive
Offender-Alternatives to Extradition: A Survey of United States Practice, 1964 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L
77,82-89 (discussing exclusion, expulsion, and special arrangements as alternatives to extradition).
206. See, e.g., SENATE CoMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TREATY WITH THE BAHAMAS ON
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, S. EXEc. REp. No. 12, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
1-3 (1989); Treaty for Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-Mex., 27 I.L.M. 443; European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, April 20, 1959, Europ. T.S. No. 30
(entered into force June 12, 1962).
207. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. S 1782 (1988) (authorizing Unites States courts to provide judicial
assistance in response to letters rogatory); United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165, 172-73 (6th Cir.
1971) (discussing Unites States courts' "inherent" power to use letters rogatory); cf SENATE
CoMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, LEGISLATIVE AcriviTy REPORT, S. REP. No. 30, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 15 (1991) (questioning efficiency of letters rogatory).
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international legal system, in other words, has asserted a strong interest in
deterring and punishing crime.
At present, discourse over jurisdiction focuses on the question of which
state has the strongest interest in the conduct or individuals in question.
In United States v. Columba-Colella208 the court rejected the United States
assertion of passive personality jurisdiction over a Mexican national accused
of receiving stolen goods belonging to a United States national. Because the
crime was committed in Mexico, the court reasoned, the United States
lacked "competence" to exercise jurisdiction, notwithstanding the harm to
a United States national.209 The court added in dictum that the United
States would lack competence to establish jurisdiction even over a Mexican
who murdered a United States national in Mexico. 210 The court ap-
parently did not consider it relevant whether Mexico objected to a United
States prosecution, or even whether Mexico itself planned to prosecute,
noting only that the defendant would be "subject to whatever sanctions are
applicable under the law of Mexico." 211
Considering the facts of the case, the outcome in Columba-Colella is
probably unobjectionable. Even a broader view of passive personality, like
that suggested in this Article, might decline to exercise jurisdiction over less
serious, non-violent crimes committed abroad, if only to minimize the
possibility of conflict among states. The reasoning of the opinion, however,
is open to question. The court offered no explanation or authority for its
assertion that the United States lacks competence to prosecute a Mexican
national for murder of a United States national in Mexico, except to say
that "[n]o one would argue" for such a result.2 12 The court apparently
did not consider it relevant whether Mexico or the international system as
a whole actually might want the United States to prosecute in some such
cases-if, for example, the offender were present in the United States and
could not be extradited for lack of an extradition treaty or some other
reason. The court focused, in other words, purely on what it perceived as
the remote United States interest at stake, without considering whether
interests outside the United States-in Mexico, and among states as a
whole-might argue for a United States prosecution.
208. 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979).
209. Id. at 360. The court offered no authority for its conclusion that the United States
would lack "competence" to prosecute in such circumstances, saying only that "[n]o one would
argue" that Congress could establish such jurisdiction or that courts could enforce it. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 361.
212. Id. at 360. The court did not acknowledge that many foreign states have established
jurisdiction in precisely those circumstances. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 76 (foreign penal
codes). On the other hand, the court's decision predates most of the United States statutes
establishing passive personality jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 36-52.
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To be sure, a focus on a state's individual interest can serve as a useful
surrogate for systemic concerns-that is, for the interest of the international
legal system in suppressing crime. For example, a state seeking to exercise
territorial jurisdiction over a crime will likely conclude that it has a stronger
claim to jurisdiction than do states seeking to exercise nationality or passive
personality jurisdiction,213 and the competing states will likely acquiesce
in that judgment. In such a case the territorial state's interest in
prosecuting coincides with the preference of the international legal system
that crimes be tried in the state in which they occurred.
But the interest of an individual state may sometimes seem weaker
than the interest of the system as a whole in prosecuting a particular
offender. Here, reliance on an individual state's "interests" overlooks the
systemic interests at stake. For example, the international community
might have an interest in prosecuting crimes involving only stateless persons
on the high seas or in Antarctica, even though no one state had any
interest. Similarly, individual states have asserted that the state of a murder
victim's nationality has no interest in prosecuting the offender, regardless
of whether any other state prosecutes. Such an assertion implies that the
international legal system insists on prosecution by the state in which the
crime occurred, or perhaps by the state of the offender's nationality, even
if those states cannot or will not prosecute. But the international com-
munity's commitment to law enforcement suggests that it should prefer a
prosecution by some state to no prosecution at all. In such a case the
victim's home state might vindicate not only its own interests but promote
the systemic interests of the international legal system. The victim's home
state, in other words, may serve as a kind of "private attorney
general."214
This is not to suggest that every unprosecuted crime should be
amenable to universal jurisdiction. Prosecutorial discretion and evidentiary
constraints are part of every domestic legal system. A state seeking to
exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction should be required to rely on
one of the five recognized bases of jurisdiction. But there may be times
when the systemic interest in prosecution requires resort to the more exotic
of these five bases.
The Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States,215 adopted in 1987, has recognized this systemic interest in its
much-maligned provision describing limitations on jurisdiction. Section
213. See discussion supra part III.
214. Cf Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,263-71 (1975) (relating
to attorneys' fees for private attorneys general).
215. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1.
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403(2) now calls on states to determine the reasonableness of a particular
exercise of jurisdiction by evaluating a number of factors, ranging from the
site of the crime to the nationality of the relevant parties.216  This
provision, the most controversial of the entire Restatement, has been
roundly criticized for adopting a rule of "international law" requiring
"reasonableness" and "balancing" when international law has not gone that
far.217
Whatever the merits of that dispute, a different aspect of Section 403
deserves praise. The Second Restatement asserted that the limits of
jurisdiction depended entirely on the state's connection to the crime. It
looked to factors like a state's "vital national interests" and the nationality
of the person sought.218 Section 403 cites similar factors, but it also
looks beyond the four corners of the state. It asserts that jurisdiction
should also turn on "the importance of the regulation to the international
political, legal, or economic system" and "the extent to which the regulation
is consistent with the traditions of the international system."219 The
Third Restatement thus envisions a more thorough inquiry than that set
forth in the Second Restatement and Columba-Colella.22o
In sum, the jurisprudence of extraterritorial jurisdiction should
continue to rely on the rights of individual states, which usually ap-
proximate the interest of the international community as a whole. When,
however, the choice is between the exercise of an exotic form of juris-
diction, such as passive personality jurisdiction or universal jurisdiction, and
no prosecution by any state at all, decisionmakers should consider whether
the international legal system has an interest in prosecution. A focus on
rights of individual states will not always further that larger interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
The passive personality principle has a shabby reputation that is largely
undeserved. A number of states have established passive personality
jurisdiction over common crimes, and most states recognize it as a
legitimate tool in combatting terrorism. To be sure, it is prudent to
approach passive personality jurisdiction with caution. Like any form of
216. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 403(2).
217. See, e.g., JANIS, supra note 176, at 258 ("The Restatement (Revised) is unsupported by
precedent when it asserts that reasonableness is a limit imposed by international law.").
218. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 40 (1965).
219. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, S 403(2)(e)-().
220. 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979).
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extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, it can be seen as an intrusion into the
sovereignty of the state in which the conduct occurred, and can be exercised
only through international cooperation in production of evidence and
witnesses. As such, it should be a last-resort form of jurisdiction, a device
to be held in reserve unless other interested states fail to prosecute. But it
should not be dismissed altogether. Passive personality jurisdiction can
help ensure that fugitives do not literally get away with murder.
The continuing controversy over passive personality jurisdiction
illustrates the larger need for a multilateral convention on jurisdiction.
States are relying on extraterritorial jurisdiction with increasing frequency,
which will inevitably lead to more conflicts over jurisdiction. For this
reason, it has become more important than ever that the international
community establish some benchmarks on jurisdiction that reflect the
interests of the international legal system and not just those of individual
states. Disagreements over jurisdiction may make negotiation of a Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction impossible in the near term, but discussing the issues
in a multilateral forum might at least promote greater understanding of
different states' positions on jurisdiction. If nothing else, negotiations
would be a beginning.
The international community has managed to establish multilateral
conventions covering most other significant areas of international law.
Meanwhile, a renewed multilateralism has rejuvenated the United Nations,
resulting in international cooperation on Somalia, Iraq, and other matters.
It is time to extend that cooperative spirit to jurisdiction as well.
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